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Abstract 
Most of the existing reputation systems in mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) consider only node 
reputations when selecting routes. Reputation and trust are therefore generally ensured within a 
one-hop distance when routing decisions are made, which often fail to provide the most reliable, 
trusted route. In this report, we first summarize the background studies on the security of MANET. 
Then, we propose a system that is based on path reputation, which is computed from reputation 
and trust values of each and every node in the route. The use of path reputation greatly enhances 
the reliability of resulting routes. The detailed system architecture and components design of the 
proposed mechanism are carefully described on top of the AODV (Ad-hoc On-demand Distance 
Vector) routing protocol. We also evaluate the performance of the proposed system by simulating 
it on top of AODV. Simulation experiments show that the proposed scheme greatly improves 
network throughput in the midst of misbehavior nodes while requires very limited message 
overhead. To our knowledge, this is the first path-based reputation system proposal that may be 
implemented on top of a non-source based routing scheme such as AODV. 
List of Acronyms 
AODV   Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector 
ARAN   Authenticated routing for ad hoc networks 
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CONFIDANT  Cooperation Of Nodes: Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc NeTworks 
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1. Introduction 
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) are communication networks in which nodes can dynamically 
establish and maintain connectivity with each other. Each node can also act as a router to forward 
packets on behalf of other nodes. Their major advantages include low cost, simple network 
maintenance, and convenient service coverage. These benefits, however, come with a cost. One of 
the main challenges is ensuring security and reliability in such networks that are dynamic and 
versatile in nature. 
 
Reputation systems in MANET are intended to address the challenge. They are effectively in 
detecting nodes that are selfish or malicious. Most existing ones, however, consider only 
neighbors’ reputations when selecting routes. In such systems, each node selects the next hop from 
its neighbors based on their reputation and trust values, thus trustworthiness is only ensured in a 
one-hop distance when making routing decisions. Since no node in the route has a complete view 
of the entire route, it is hard to select the best route when the path contains multiple hops. These 
greedy approaches usually do not provide most reliable routes [Buchegger and Le Boudec 2002; 
Michiardi and Molva 2002; Bansal and Baker 2003; Buchegger and Le Boudec 2003; Rebahi, 
Mujica et al. 2005; Hu and Burmester 2006]. Furthermore, almost all existing works built their 
reputation systems on top of DSR (Dynamic Source Routing) [Marti, Giuli et al. 2000; Buchegger 
and Le Boudec 2002; Michiardi and Molva 2002; Bansal and Baker 2003; Buchegger and Le 
Boudec 2003; Rebahi, Mujica et al. 2005; Hu and Burmester 2006]. 
 
In this report we propose a reputation system that maintains path reputation based on reputation 
and trust of every node in the path and each node evaluates the path reputation from itself to the 
destination node. In the system, nodes’ reputations are calculated on direct observations and 
second hand information, and an ALARM message is introduced to exchange the second hand 
information between nodes. The path reputation is carried by control messages of the underline 
routing protocol. We use innovative ways to increment and decrement trust values corresponding 
to positive and negative observations, respectively. We also consider range of values (instead of 
absolute values) for trust to weigh second-hand information, thus avoid unnecessary transient 
fluctuations. As a result, the system is very effective in detecting misbehaviors and in ensuring 
efficient routing. 
 
We believe that this is the first path-based reputation system proposed that is not for source-based 
MANET routing (such as DSR). AODV [Perkins and Royer 1999] has become a very important 
MANET routing protocol. It has been chosen as the default routing protocol for IEEE 802.11s, and 
recently has been implemented in most of new laptops. We believe that proposing a reputation 
system that can effectively equip AODV against selfish and malicious nodes contributes 
significantly to MANET research. A summary of major results has been submitted for publication 
[Li and Moh 2009]. 
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2. Background and Related Studies 
Security issues in MANET mostly result from the following attributes of the network: 
1. Nodes communicate with each other on a wireless medium which is a shared resource.  
2. The network is decentralized and distributed. Therefore there is no central agency to 
provide trustworthiness throughout the network. 
3. Network topology could change dynamically since nodes may have high mobility and 
are free to join and leave the network. In such networks, to provide secure routing 
mechanism is difficult because routing updates happen frequently. 
 
Various reputation systems and other approaches were proposed to resolve these issues. In this 
section, we present a summary of these approaches based on the published studies. 
 
2.1. Reputation Systems for MANET 
Reputation systems in MANET are intended to address the challenge of ensuring security and 
reliability in dynamic and versatile networks. They effectively avoid selfish or malicious nodes 
from routes based on neighbors’ reputations. Many reputation systems have been proposed in 
MANET. Here, we discuss a few of the most important and popular ones. 
2.1.1. CORE 
CORE is a reputation system in MANET aiming to solve the selfish node problem [Michiardi and 
Molva 2002]. CORE is based on DSR and only evaluates the reputations in base system. For each 
node, routes are prioritized based on global reputations associated with neighbors. The global 
reputation is a combination of three kinds of reputation that are evaluated by the node. These three 
reputations are subjective, indirect and functional reputation. The subjective reputation is 
calculated based on node’s direct observation while indirect reputation is the second hand 
information that sends to the node by the reply message (the reply message could be ROUTE 
REPLY for routing, or ACK packet for data forwarding). The subjective and indirect reputation is 
evaluated for each base system functions, such as routing and data forwarding. And the functional 
reputation is defined as the sum of the subjective and indirect reputation on a specific function. 
The global reputation is then calculated as a sum of functional reputations with a weight assigned 
to each function. CORE uses watchdog (WD) mechanism to detect node’s misbehaver. For each 
node, there is a WD associated with each function, and the WD stores an expected result in the 
buffer for each request. If the expectation is met, the WD will delete the entry for the target node 
and reputations for all related nodes will be increased based on the list in reply message (reply 
message contains a list for all nodes successfully participated the service); if expectation is not 
met or time-out, the WD will decrease the subjective reputation for the target node in the 
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reputation table. In CORE system, only positive information is sent over network within reply 
messages, therefore CORE can eliminate the DOS attacks caused by spread negative information 
over network. And the past observations have more weight than the current observation in CORE. 
 
The advantages of CORE system include that it is a simple scheme, easy to implement, and not 
sensitive to the resource. CORE uses reply message to transmit the second hand reputation 
information, thus no extra message is introduced by reputation system. When there is no 
interaction between nodes, the nodes’ reputations are gradually decreased, which discourages the 
node to misbehave. 
 
The disadvantages of CORE include that it is designed to solve selfish node problem thus it is not 
very efficient to other malicious problems. CORE is a single layer reputation system with first 
hand and second hand information having the same weight; it doesn’t evaluate trustworthiness 
before accepting the second hand information, thus the system can not prevent risks on spreading 
incorrect second hand information. In CORE system, only positive information is exchanged 
between nodes, therefore another half capability carrying negative information is lost. Reputations 
are only evaluated between neighbors in one hop distance while the whole path usually contains 
multiple hops; in consequence, the result is not accurate/optimized for the whole path. Some 
simulations show that CORE is not very efficient when nodes have high mobility. 
 
2.1.2. CO"FIDA"T 
CONFIDANT, Cooperation Of Nodes: Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc NeTworks, provides more 
comprehensive protection to network than CORE, and it is designed to solve any detectable 
malicious behaviours [Buchegger and Le Boudec 2002; Buchegger and Le Boudec 2003]. 
CONFIDANT is based on DSR and uses two layers reputation system. It evaluates not only the 
node’s reputation in the base system but also the trustworthiness for nodes in reputation system. 
Different from CORE, CONFIDANT allows both positive and negative information exchanged 
between nodes and introduces an ALARM message for carrying second hand information. When a 
node receives a second hand information by ALARM message, it first evaluates the 
trustworthiness of the source node, if it is trustable, the second hand information will be applied to 
the target node’s reputation, if the source node is not trustable, a deviation test will be performed 
on the received information, if the information is matched the target node’s reputation history, it 
will still be applied to the target node’s reputation, if the deviation test is failed (the information is 
not matched the target’s reputation history), the received information will be discard. In 
CONFIDANT, past observations have less weight than the current one, thus the node can recover 
from its accidently misbehaves by keep acting correctly in the system; this fading mechanism will 
encourage nodes to behave correctly. Like CORE, the reputation value will be gradually decreased 
when there is no interaction between nodes, which discourages misbehaviors. CONFIDANT also 
has the disadvantage that reputations are only evaluated between neighbors. 
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The authors also evaluate the performance of CONFIDANT by the comparison with standard 
DSR. They construct the simulation on GloMoSim [Zeng, Bagrodia et al. 1998] with variables in 
the total number of nodes in the network, the percentage of malicious nodes, the pause time, and 
the number of applications. Simulation results show that CONFIDANT performs better than DSR 
by introducing a small overhead for extra message exchanges (ratio of number of ALARM 
messages to number of other control messages is 1% -2%), but the performance drops with 
increasing in nodes’ mobility. The results are reasonable since high node mobility indicates high 
chance to lose routes and high cost for routes reestablishing.  
 
2.1.3. SAFE and Others 
SAFE: Securing pAcket Forwarding in ad hoc nEtworks, is another reputation system in MANET 
[Rebahi, Mujica et al. 2005]. Same as CONFIDANT, SAFE gives more weight on recent 
observation than the previous ones, and allows positive and negative information exchanged 
among nodes. In SAFE, when a node detects misbehavior from another node through a direct 
monitoring, it has to broadcast this information to its neighborhood; and when a neighbor receives 
the second hand information, instead of directly updating the target node’s reputation value with 
the information it received, it queries the rest nodes in the neighborhood for their opinions 
regarding the target node and then update the reputation value based on the received information. 
When a misbehave node recovers and joins again the network, SAFE assigns a “critical” 
reputation value to it, which makes the node easier to be discard from network when it 
misbehaves.  
 
Watchdog and pathrater are methods proposed as extensions of DSR to improve the throughput in 
an ad-hoc network in the presence of nodes that misbehave [Marti, Giuli et al. 2000]. In the 
network, each node maintains the reputation of every other node it knows about. Different from 
any above reputation systems, a node calculates an average node reputation in the path and use 
pathrater to evaluate the reliability of the path by this average reputation instead of just base on 
neighbors’ reputation. Since pathrater has more knowledge of the complete path, it is able to select 
more reliable route than the neighbor reputation based system. But since each node only maintains 
reputation for other nodes it knows about, only part of nodes in a path is counted when calculating 
the average reputation. Also, pathrater relies on the route information in DSR to determine nodes 
in the path, which make the method is impossible to work on other MANET routing protocols 
except DSR 
 
2.2. Other Approaches for MANET Security 
Security issues in MANET are mainly on AAA (authentication, authorization, and accounting), 
key management and secure routing. One of the previous studies suggested that the strategies to 
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enhance security of MANET should focus on embedding security mechanism into different 
network protocols such as routing and MAC protocols, developing intrusion detection systems to 
monitor service and respond attacks, and designing multi-protocol-layer security schemes to solve 
problems in different layers simultaneously [Akyildiz and Wang 2005]. 
 
Yih-Chun and Perrig studied on secure wireless Ad-hoc routing protocols [Yih-Chun and Perrig 
2004]. They have presented different kinds of secure routing protocols which include: 
1. Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance vector routing protocol (SEAD) [Yih-Chun, Johnson 
et al. 2002] is a securing routing protocol based on Destination-Sequenced 
Distance-Vector routing protocol (DSDV) [Perkins and Bhagwat 1994]. Instead of using 
certificate-chain, this protocol utilizes the sequence number and one-way hash chain to 
authenticate lower bonder of metric, and then authenticates the routing update entry. 
2. Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) [Papadimitratos and Haas 2002] requires a security 
association only between communicating nodes. This protocol uses this security 
association just to authenticate ROUTE REQUESTS and ROUTE REPLYS through the 
use of message authentication codes. However, the protocol doesn’t prevent the 
unauthorized modification of the fields in packets. 
3. Authenticated routing for ad hoc networks (ARAN) [Sanzgiri 2002] requires each node 
in the network has a certificate signed by a trusted authority, which associates its IP 
address with a public key. And each node in the path verifies the certificate and 
signature of the previous and the source hops and then forward the ROUTE REQUESTS 
and ROUTE REPLYS with its own certificate and signature. 
4. Secure AODV (SAODV) [Zapata and Asokan 1999] is similar to ARAN. Both of them 
use a signature to authenticate most fields of a ROUTE REQUEST and ROUTE REPLY, 
but SAODV utilizes hash chains to authenticate the hop count instead of an extra 
signature to verify previous hop. 
 
In this paper, they also pointed out that the secure routing problem isn’t well modeled in MANET 
and optimistic approaches are needed to balance between security and performance. 
 
2.2.1 Key Management 
The key management is an important task for network security. However, it is difficult because 
the network has no central authority to manage security keys.  
 
A self-organized public-key scheme is proposed to solve the key management problem in 
distributed networks [Hubaux, Batttan et al. 2001]. In the proposed scheme, each node in the 
network stores the certificates issued by itself as well as a set of selected certificates issued by 
other nodes. When any pair of nodes needs to communicate each other, they first merge the local 
certificate repositories and then find the appropriate certificate chains within the merged 
repositories that can pass this public keys verification, after that, they are able to trust each other 
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and exchange keys to secure their communicate channel. The proposed key management scheme 
is decentralized and has equivalent role for each node, which make it efficient in distributed 
network environment. However, this method only has probabilistic guarantees, thus appropriate 
certificate chains may not be found even if they exist. 
 
In this paper, the authors also evaluate the performance of the algorithm to find appropriate 
certificate chains based on real Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) trust graphs with variables in trust 
graph size [Hubaux, Batttan et al. 2001]. The algorithm that they present is more efficient in small 
graph size but modifications are required for improving scalability.    
 
2.2.2. Trust Enhanced Routing 
One study has described the way to use fuzzy trust in P2P networks [Griffiths, Kuo-Ming et al. 
2006]. Considering the similarities between P2P networks and Wireless Mesh Networks, this 
approach can also be applied to wireless mesh routing mechanisms. Fuzzy trust provides unclear 
border between trusted and untrusted nodes, and defines some middle areas in-between, which is 
more realistic than the one with the clear border. By using fuzzy trust, nodes’ trust can be 
evaluated more accurately.   
 
A trust enhanced Mobile Ad-hoc NETworks (MANET) routing protocol, Secure MANET Routing 
with Trust Intrigue (SMRTI), is proposed recently [Balakrishnan, Varadharajan et al. 2007]. 
SMRTI is based on DSR, and it selects routes by the trust of packet. Packet’s trust depends on a 
few important nodes in the route, such as source node, destination node, previous node and next 
node. Since each packet caches the whole route in DSR, all necessary information needed to 
evaluate the trust can be derived from packet, thus, no extra message is introduced to exchange the 
trust information. Meanwhile, the nodes’ mobility should have less impact to the protocol since all 
the necessary information is contained in the packet. However, SMRTI is specifically designed for 
DSR and uses some unique features in DSR, which make it hard to be applied in the other routing 
protocols.  
 
This paper also evaluated the performance of SMRTI by packet delivery ratio (PDR) 
[Balakrishnan, Varadharajan et al. 2007]. The PDR is defined as the average ratio of total number 
of CBR data packets, which is received by the destination, to the total number of CBR packets, 
sent by source. They construct the simulation on NS-2 with variables in proportion of the 
malicious nodes and network connectivity. The simulation results show that SMRTI performs 
better than the standard DSR. The performance of SMRTI can keep flat with high node mobility 
(50m/s) even in the case that 80% nodes in the network are malicious nodes. These results are 
promising, but may depend on the simulation configuration that authors used. Simulation 
parameters indicate a density network with relatively long radio range. In this situation, the 
mobility and percentage of malicious nodes could have less impact to the system.  
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2.3. AODV 
AODV is an on-demand routing protocol [Perkins and Royer 1999]. The route is initiated by 
broadcasting the route requests message from the source, and the message is then propagated 
through the entire network. When the destination node or an intermediate node which has a route 
receives the route request message, it responds with a route reply message. Route request, route 
reply and route error are the control messages that are sent during the route establishing process 
for updating the route table of nodes in the route.  
 
One previous study has classified misuses of the AODV protocol into two categories: atomic 
misuses and compound misuses [Ning and Sun 2003]. Atomic misuses are performed by 
manipulating a single routing message, while compound misuses are composed of multiple atomic 
misuses, and possibly normal uses of the routing protocol. They further divide the atomic misuse 
actions in AODV into the following four categories: 
1. “Drop Reply. The attacker simply drops the received routing message.” 
2. “Modify and Forward. After receiving a routing message, the attacker modifies one or 
several fields in the message and then forwards the message to its neighbor(s) (via 
unicast or broadcast).” 
3. “Forge Reply. The attacker sends a faked message in response to the received routing 
message. Forge Reply is mainly related to the misuse of ROUTE REPLY messages, 
which are in response of ROUTE REQUEST messages.” 
4. “Active Forge. The attacker sends a faked routing message without receiving any related 
message” 
 
Similarly, another paper has classified main attacks to AODV as follows [Liu, Li et al. 2005]: 
1. “Black Hole Attack - The attacker broadcasts some fraudulent messages to make others 
believe that data can be transmitted through itself with the shortest path or least cost, 
while this trickster never forwards these data packets, which forms a “black hole”, that 
is, absorbing in everything but never giving out.” 
2. “Routing Table Overflow Attack - A malicious node keeps sending a large number of 
ROUTE REQUEST message for some node that don’t exist, which consumes lots of 
computation and network bandwidth and causes failure to build normal route, even the 
paralysis of entire network.” 
3. “Network Segmentation Attack 
 Fabricating ROUTE ERROR Packet Attack: Malicious nodes broadcast fabricated 
ROUTE ERROR packets to destroy the route table of its neighbors, which causes 
network segmentation and lower performance. 
 Interrupt Routing Attack: The selfish node drops the received routing messages 
from its neighbors for limited power and computation ability, which also causes 
network segmentation.” 
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3. Path-Based Reputation System 
3.1. Main Ideas 
A. Two Levels of Information: First-hand and Second-hand 
The proposed system makes used of both first-hand and second-hand information. First-hand 
information is direct observations. Second-hand information arrives from indirect observations; 
i.e., a neighbor node’s observations of other nodes. Note that RREQ and RREP (AODV control 
packets) are also considered as second-hand information. All second-hand information will go 
through a trust test, which is discussed next. 
 
B. Two Levels of Credibility: Reputation and Trust 
The proposed system contains two levels of credibility. Reputation tells whether the node behaves 
correctly in the base system (routing protocol) while trust indicates whether the node lies in the 
reputation system. Specifically, the trust system evaluates the credibility of second-hand 
information sent by a neighbor. 
 
C. Two Levels of Reputation: "ode-based and Path-based Reputation 
In addition to node reputation that is formed by both first- and second-hand information, the 
proposed system computes path reputation based on node-reputation of all the nodes in the path. 
Routing decision is then based first on path reputation, then if there is a tie, on path distance. Note 
that routes that have very low path reputation are discarded even during route discovery phase (by 
discarding RREQ and RREP packets). This approach significantly improves throughput and 
reduces protocol message overhead. 
 
D. Range-based vs. Value-based Reputation and Trust 
Computing node and path reputation values need to factor in the trust of second-hand information. 
Instead of using an absolute trust value, the proposed system makes use of ranges. That is, if two 
trust values fall within the same range, they are assigned the same level of trust (same weight). 
This avoids unnecessary adjustments caused by transient fluctuations that are quite frequent in 
MANET. 
3.2. System Design 
In this subsection, we present a high-level view of the system design. Major components will be 
described in detail in the next subsection. Figure 1 shows the architecture of the proposed system. 
It includes five components described below. The arrows indicate interactions among these 
components. Solid arrows are specifically for exchanges of reputation system messages, including 
direct observations (such as suspicious events), indirect observations (also called ALARM), and 
trust values. Dotted arrows are for routing control messages RREQ and RREP (they also carry 
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path reputation values). Note that an extra field is needed on RREQ and RREP messages to hold 
path reputation values. 
 
The proposed system constrains following components:  
1. Event monitor: It detects suspicious events and feeds them to the Node reputation manager. It 
also receives second-hand information (i.e., ALARM messages) from neighbors and routing 
control messages by interacting with the underlying routing protocol (AODV). It then feeds 
these indirect observations to the Trust manager. 
2. Trust manager: It evaluates trust of second-hand information provided by the Event monitor. 
It then feeds the evaluated information and trust values to either node or path reputation 
managers. 
3. "ode reputation manager: It computes neighboring node reputations. This is based both on 
direct observations passed by Event monitor and on evaluated indirect observations and trust 
values passed by Trust manager. 
4. Path reputation manager: It handles path reputations based on neighbor node reputations 
(passed by Node reputation manager) and second-hand path reputations and trust values 
(passed by Trust manager). 
5. Path manager: It makes the route decision based on path reputation value fed by Path 
reputation manager and passes the decision to the underlying routing protocol (AODV). 
 
Among all the components, only event monitor and path manager have interfaces to communicate 
with the underline routing protocol. An extra field is added into both ROUTE REQUEST and 
ROUTE REPLY messages to store the path reputation. In our proposal, we defined that the 
observation is negative when misbehavior is detected by the event monitor, and the observation is 
positive when the detected behavior is correct. 
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Figure 1. System architecture. 
 
Below, we give the algorism of handling the direct and indirect observations as well as routing 
control messages. The algorithm runs on every individual node in the network. We list the main 
variables needed to execute the proposed scheme in a network node: 
• Dn: Direct observation of node n. 
• In,m: Indirect observation of node n made by node m 
• Rn: Reputation of node n based on direct observation 
• Sn: Reputation of node n based on Second-hand information 
• Tn: Trust value of node n 
• PRp: Path Reputation of route p 
• PSp,m: Path reputation of route p received from node m (considered as Second-hand 
information) 
 
Note that all the reputation and trust values are normalized between 0 and 1;  
 
Initialization: Tm = Rn = 1, PR = ∅ 
Waiting for the incoming event from the monitor module: 
1. [EM] If a Dn is detected: 
1.a  [NRM] If Dn is negative: 
[NRM] Calculate the node reputation Rn by Equation (6) 
1.b  Else  
[NRM] Calculate the node reputation Rn by Equation (7) 
1.c [NRM] If Rn changed more than a threshold (Th_alarm), send ALARM to all neighbors 
 
2. [EM] If a In,m is detected: 
2.a [TM] Do the deviation test on In,m by Equation (1) 
2.b [TM] If Tm is trusted OR deviation test is passed: 
2.c   [NRM] If In,m is negative: 
[NRM] Calculate the node reputation Rn by Equation (8) & (10)  
2.d   Else  
[NRM] Calculate the node reputation Rn by Equation (9) & (10)  
2.e  [TM] If deviation test is passed: 
[TM] Update Tm by Equation (5) 
2.f  Else 
[TM] Update Tm by Equation (3) 
  
3. [EM] If a RREQ is detected: 
3.a [PRM] Update the path reputation PRp by Equation (11) 
3.b [PRM] If the path reputation is below a threshold (Th_route), discard RREQ message 
3.c  Else 
[PM] Update the path reputation in RREQ and broadcast RREQ to all neighbors 
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4. [EM] If a RREP is detected: 
4.a [PRM] Update the path reputation PRp by Equation (11) 
4.b [PRM] If the path reputation is below a threshold (Th_route), discard RREP message 
4.c  Else 
4.d [PM] If it is current node requests this route: 
[PM] Update PRp and prioritize routes based on path reputations PRp  
4.e   Else 
[PM] Update the path reputation in RREP and send RREP to next hop 
3.3. Major Components 
In this section, three major components are described in detail. 
3.3.1 Trust manager  
Recall that it is responsible to evaluate the trust of second-hand observations as well as that of 
second-hand path reputation reported in routing control messages.  
 
(A) Deviation Test and Decrement/Increment Functions 
First, in order to prevent false alarms, we adopt the deviation test method [4, 5] to evaluate a new 
second-hand observation, as shown below. The idea is that a second-hand observation is trusted 
only if it does not differ too much from the node’s own direct observation. In this case, the trust is 
increased. Otherwise, it is decreased. The increment and decrement are each further guided by a 
quadratic function to be described below. 
 
Following is the condition to pass the deviation test: 
|Dn – In,m | < d     (1) 
In the above, d is the threshold for the test (d = 0.1 is used in this work). If the difference between 
Dn (direct observation) and In,m (new indirect observation give by node m) is greater than or equal 
to d, then In,m fails the deviation test, and Tm, the trust value of node m that sent this second-hand 
observation, is decreased by a decrement function, fD (refer to Figure 2a): 
fD (Tm) = ½ (Tm)
2
       (2)  
that is 
Tm = Tm – fD (Tm)    (3) 
 
On the other hand, if the difference between Dn and In,m is less than d, then the test is passed, and 
Tm is increased by an increment function, fI (refer to Figure 2b): 
fI (Tm) = Tm - ½ (Tm)
2
   (4) 
that is 
 Tm = Tm + fI (Tm)    (5) 
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(a).  fD (Tm)          (b).  fI (Tm) 
Figure 2. Decrement and increment functions. 
The quadratic function fD is used such that the decrement of trust is small when the trust value is 
still small. Yet, when the trust value is large, the corresponding decrement needs to be larger to 
“punish” more severely the bad behavior. The increment function fI  may be similarly explained. 
Note that these two functions are also used in node and path reputations. 
 
(B) Ranged-based Trust Values 
Second, to prevent transient fluctuations, categorized (or range) values are used for trust (instead 
of absolute values). In our implementation, the trust value is categorized into three ranges:  
 Trust,   1 ≥ Tm > 0.7 
Tm∈  Untrust,  0.7 ≥ Tm > 0.3 
 Distrust,  0.3 ≥ Tm > 0 
This Tm value is then fed to either Node or Path reputation managers to aid their evaluations of 
node or path reputations. 
3.3.2 "ode Reputation Manager  
The node reputation manager computes node reputation based on both direct observations from 
the Event monitor and the trust-evaluated indirect observations from the Trust manager. For each 
new direct and indirect observation concerning a node n, it computes the new reputation value of 
node n by making use of the decrement and increment functions introduced above (in Equations 1 
and 2), and by using a weighted combination of direct and indirect observations, as follows: 
1. If the new observation is a direct observation 
a. If the observation is negative 
Then Rn = Rn – fD (Rn)    (6) 
b. Else (positive observation) 
Rn = Rn + fI (Rn)     (7) 
2. Else (indirect observation, say In,m) 
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If Tm is trusted or In,m passed the deviation test at the Trust manager 
a. If the observation is negative 
Then Sn = Rn – fD (Rn)    (8) 
b. Else (positive observation) 
Sn = Rn + fI (Rn)     (9) 
3. Update Rn by a weighted combination 
Rn = (1- w1) Rn + w1 Sn ,     (10) 
where (in this work)   
 0.1,  Tm ∈ {Trust} 
  w1= f(Tm) =   0.05, if Tm ∈ {Untrust} 
 0.025,  Tm ∈ {Distrust}    
3.3.3 Path Reputation Manager  
When the Path reputation manager obtains a new path reputation value (say passed by node n) 
from the Trust manager, it also receives the trust level of Tn. In addition, it obtains Rn from the 
Node reputation manager. Based on these values, it computes the new path reputation value, PRp, 
by taking the minimum of Rn and a weighted value of PSp, n, as follows: 




where the weight w2 is a function of Tn and is defined below in our implementation 
 1,    Tn ∈ {Trust} 
w2 =  0.5,  if Tn ∈ {Untrust} 
 0.25,   Tn ∈ {Distrust} 
If, however, the new PRp falls below a pre-defined threshold value (Th_route), then the RREP or 
RREQ is dropped. This ensures that only trusted RREP and RREQ are forwarded. 
3.4. Base Case: Node-based Reputation System 
In order to understand the advantage of the proposed path-based reputation system, we also 
implemented a node-based reputation system in the simulation. It is identical to the proposed 
system except that Equation (11) is simply: 
 PRp = Rn       (12) 
Thus, each node in the network selected route based on the neighbor’s (the potential next hop) 
reputation rather than a path-based reputation. 
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3.5. System Work Flows 
In our proposal, there are four types of event that the system needs to handle. They are: 
1. Direct observation of a suspicious event. 
2. Second hand observation by an ALARM message. 
3. ROUTE REQUEST message from underline routing protocol. 
4. ROUTE REQUEST message from underline routing protocol. 
 
We discuss system work flows for every event in detail in this section. 
3.5.1. Direct Observation of a Suspicious Event 
When a node detects a suspicious event by direct observation, the event monitor forwards the 
event to node reputation manager for evaluation, and then the node reputation manager updates 
the reputation by Equation 6 or 7 for the target node accordingly and sends out an ALARM 
message to the neighbors. Figure 3 illustrates how the system handles a direct 
observation.
 
Figure 3. Flowchart for direct observation of a suspicious event. 
 
3.5.2. Second Hand Observation by an ALARM Message 
Figure 4 shows the flowchart when a node receives an ALARM message. The event monitor 
forwards the ALARM to trust manager, which evaluate whether the ALARM is sent by a trusted 
source. If the ALARM is from an untrusted source, rather than discard the message directly, trust 
manager performs the deviation test (Equation 1). If the ALARM message passes the deviation 
test or it is from a trusted source, node reputation manager updates the node reputation (Equation 
10) accordingly, otherwise, it is discarded by system. For both cases, trust manager will update the 
trust of the source node by deviation test result (Equation 3 or 5).  
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Figure 4. Flowchart for receiving an ALARM message. 
 
3.5.3. ROUTE REQUEST Message from Routing Protocol 
As shown in Figure 5, when a node receives an ROUTE REQUEST message, the event monitor 
forwards the message to path reputation manager. Path reputation manager then checks the path 
reputation in the message. If the path reputation is below the threshold, the message will be 
discarded, otherwise, the path reputation in the message will be updated (Equation 11) and the 
message will be forwarded neighbors.  
 
 
Figure 5. Flowchart for receiving an ROUTE REQUEST message. 
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3.5.4. ROUTE REPLY Message from Routing Protocol 
As shown in Figure 6, when a node receives an ROUTE REPLY message, the event monitor 
forwards the message to path reputation manager. Path reputation manager then checks the path 
reputation in the message. If the path reputation is below the threshold, the message will be 
discarded. Otherwise, the message will be forwarded to the path manager. If it is the current node 
that requests the route, path manager will prioritize routes based on their path reputation; or path 




 Figure 6. Flowchart for receiving an ROUTE REPLY message. 
 
3.6. Protocol Overhead and Complexity Analysis 
In this section we note that the additional overhead required by the proposed system has the same 
complexity as AODV; this includes time (for computation), space (for storage), and message (for 
extra control packets) complexities. For each node, reputation and trust values are stored in hash 
tables, thus the computation of reputation and trust has time complexity O(1) based on equations 
in section 3.3. The space complexity is O(N) as the maximum table size can be up to N entries for 
the reputation and trust tables, which has the same space complexity as the AODV when these 
values are stored in neighbors table. Since path reputation values are carried by the AODV routing 
control messages, the only extra message we introduced is the ALARM message, which could be 
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as there are up to 
N nodes to send alarm messages in the network, which is the same message complexity as the 
AODV routing control messages. 
4. Performance Evaluation 
4.1. Simulation Settings 
The simulation was developed on GloMoSim 2.03 [Zeng, Bagrodia et al. 1998] with the standard 
AODV implementation. The simulated network contained 50 nodes distributed uniformly in a 
1600 meters by 1600 meters area. Each simulation experiment lasts for 10 minutes. The mobility 
mode was set to the Random Waypoint Model; in which nodes moved to a random destination at a 
speed uniformly distributed between 0 and 5 m/sec and stayed at this destination for 20 sec. 
Misbehaved nodes are selected randomly, excluding source and destination nodes. Both UDP 
(supporting CBR) and TCP (supporting FTP) are evaluated, each with 10 pairs of source and 
destination nodes chosen randomly. Finally, Th_alarm = 0.49 and Th_route = 0.51 for the 
reputation system. 
 
4.2. Misbehaviors and Performance Metrics 
While there are many possible MANET misbehaviors, in the simulation we implement three major 
MANET routing behaviors [Ning and Sun 2003] that may be effectively dealt with by a reputation 
system: 
• Data selfish (or selfish in data forwarding) – A misbehaved node does not forward any data 
packets. 
• Forge reply (or warm-hole) attacks – A misbehaved node replies a RREP message with 
hop-count equal to 1 for any incoming RREQ message, thus the node always claims that it has 
the shortest path to the destination.  
• Combination of forge reply and data selfish. 
• Forge data– A misbehaved node modifies data packets that pass through. 
 
Note that a forge reply attack directly affects (or fakes) a routing path since it replies wrong 
routing information, whereas a data selfish or forge data misbehavior affects a single node. 
Simulation results will show that the proposed path-based reputation scheme is most effective 
when dealing with routing path attacks. 
 
Performance metrics include throughput, average end-to-end packet delay, packet lost ratio, and 
reputation message ratio, which is the percentage of reputation system messages in the overall 
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control messages (including those for routing) and represents the reputation system overhead. 
4.2.1 Implementation of Misbehaviors Detection  
• Data selfish (or selfish in data forwarding) – In simulation, the hello message is used to notify 
neighbors about the misbehavior. An extra field is added to the hello message to indicate that 
the source node is selfish in forwarding data packets. 
 
• Forge reply (or warm-hole) attacks – In simulation, misbehave node replies a RREP message 
with hop-count equal to 1 for any incoming RREQ message, an extra field is added to the 
RREP packet to indicate that the packet contains incorrect information, so that the next hop 
who receives packet can detect the misbehavior. 
 
• Forge data – In simulation, an identity string is added to the data payload, thus next hop will 
know the packet is modified by detecting the identity string. Though the next hop detects the 
modification, it still forwards the packet, and the destination node drops the packet before it is 
delivered to the upper layer network. The modified packets are transmitted though the 
network but they are not counted into the throughput. The limitation of this implementation is 
that the data payload has to be longer than the identity string size. 
 
4.3. Simulation Results: CBR over UDP 
We first set the network application to CBR with 512 bytes packets continuously sent every 200 
msec, resulting in approximately 20.5 kbps for each of the10 flows, or a total of 205 kbps in the 
network. 
 
 (A) Misbehavior: Forge Reply 
Simulation results are shown in Figure 7, including six sub-figures: throughput, average delay, 
reputation message ratio, packet lost rate, routing overhead, and reputation overhead; each shows 
three schemes: reputation-disabled, node-based reputation, and path-based reputation. These 
results indicate that the path-based reputation system is very effective in dealing with forge reply 
attack. It has more than doubled throughput comparing with node-based reputation, and more than 
tripled comparing with the original AODV; while keep the packet lost rate much lower than the 
original AODV. On the other hand, delay has only been slightly increased as many more packets 
transmitted. Its reputation message overhead has stayed very low, largely because path reputation 
is discarded as soon as it falls below Th_route. 
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Figure 7. Performance in Forge Reply (UDP). 
 
 
(B) Misbehavior: Forge Reply plus Data Selfish 
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As shown in Figure 8, throughput is improved significantly when path reputation is used (more 
than double comparing with node reputation), while the message overhead increase by less than 
2% (delay is omitted since it is similar to the above). This again proves that path-based reputation 
scheme is exceptionally effectively in dealing with path misbehaviors. 
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Figure 8. Performance in Forge Reply plus Data Selfish (UDP) 
 
(C) Misbehavior: Data Selfish 
As shown in Figure 9, path-based reputation has improved throughput by 30% or more than the 
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original AODV when misbehave nodes percentage is under 40%, but the overhead is only 
increased for under 3%. (Delay results are omitted from now on since they are similar to those in 
Figure 3.) Thus, it is also quite effective in handling data selfish. Comparing with node-based 
reputation, its advantage is not as evident. We believe it is because this misbehavior is a “local 
behavior” that can be successfully detected by a node-based reputation system, whereas the forge 
reply attack affects the entire route, in which case the proposed path-based system is exceedingly 
useful. 
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Figure 9. Performance in Data Selfish (UDP) 
 
(D) Misbehavior: Forge Data 
In this experiment, we did not see great improvement in throughput – about 20-30% when 
misbehave rate is 20-40% and message overhead remains 4%. These results also reflect that the 
proposed system is not effective in dealing with “local” misbehaviors. 
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Figure 10. Performance in Forge Data (UDP) 
4.4. Simulation Results: FTP over TCP 
In this set of experiments, TCP traffic is applied with message size of 512 bytes continuously sent 
from the ten randomly chosen sources to their corresponding receivers. The results are similar to 
those in UDP.  
 
We got the similar results on all misbehaviors as the CBR: the path reputation system improved 
the throughput when there are nodes misbehaved in the network, and the system is more efficient 
for the routing misbehaviors such as forge reply than the data forwarding misbehaviors. The 
results also show that the proposed reputation system is less efficient for TCP traffic than UDP. We 
believe that this is mainly because the congestion control in TCP effectively limits its sending rate 
(and thus throughput) when misbehaviors take place. As the result, reputation systems are not as 
effective. 
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(A) Misbehavior: Forge Reply 
Simulation results shown in Figure 11 indicate that the path-based reputation system is also 
effective in dealing with forge reply attack in TCP, though not as effective as it does in UDP. It has 
about 50% increase in throughput comparing with node-based reputation, and more than doubled 
comparing with the original AODV; and it keeps a much lower packet lost rate comparing with the 
original AODV. On the other hand, different from the slightly increase in the UDP, delay has been 
increased more obviously in TCP, we believe that is because the TCP congestion control kicked in 
as there are much more packets transmitted through the network. In the mean time, its reputation 
message overhead has stayed at a low level. 
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Figure 11. Performance in Forge Reply (TCP). 
 
(B) Misbehavior: Forge Reply plus Data Selfish 
As shown in Figure 12, throughput is dramatically decreased to 0 for the original AODV and 
node-based reputation when there are more than 20% node misbehaved in the network, we believe 
that is because the TCP is a connection oriented protocol and the pair stops transmitted data once 
the connection is lost and there is no mechanism build in out simulation to recover a connection 
after it fails. Comparing to the original AODV and node-based reputation, throughput is   
improved significantly when path reputation is used (keeps a reasonable throughput until the 
misbehave nodes rate increases to 60%), although the message overhead does not increase much.  
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Figure 12. Performance in Forge Reply plus Data Selfish (TCP) 
 
(C) Misbehavior: Data Selfish 
As shown in Figure 13, throughput is only limited improved for path-based reputation comparing 
with the original AODV, about 5%-40% when misbehave nodes percentage is under 30%. Its 
message overhead keeps the same or even lower. Thus, it is still effective in handling data selfish 
in TCP, but not as good as in UDP. Its advantage comparing with node-based reputation is not that 
evident. We believe it is because the same reason that has been discussed in UDP results - data 
selfish is a local misbehavior and the proposed system is not good at dealing with local 
misbehaviors. 
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Figure 13. Performance in Data Selfish (TCP) 
 
(D) Misbehavior: Forge Data 
As shown in Figure 14, there is no obvious improvement in throughput – about 5-10% when 
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misbehave rate is under 20%; message overhead also stays very low. Again the results help one to 
see that the proposed system is not effective in dealing with “local” misbehaviors. 
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Figure 14. Performance in Forge Data (TCP) 
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5. Conclusion 
Existing reputation systems in MANET routing only evaluate one hop distance neighbors’ 
reputation when they select the route. Since no node in the route has a complete view of the entire 
route, it is hard to select the best route when the path contains multiple hops. A path-based 
reputation system that considers path reputation as a function of reputation and trust of every node 
in the path has been proposed to solve this issue. Since the source node has a complete view of the 
entire path, it is much easier to select the best route based on the knowledge. This system utilizes a 
category (or range) approach when evaluating trust of second-hand information. It has been 
illustrated on top of AODV. Simulation results show that the proposed system is most effective 
when handling routing misbehaviors such as forge reply (or worm-hole) attacks; in most cases it 
doubles or even triples throughput comparing with a node-based reputation scheme and with the 
original AODV. Future work would include optimizing and analyzing the various parameters for a 
best performance. Further, the application of fuzzy logic in the trust category approach that we 
proposed could be explored for the practical use to fuzz the border between categories. 
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